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I examine how increases in the tariff rate impacted market prices and household consumption of 
imported rice in Nigeria during 2001-2018. I find that the country-level tariff pass-through for 
imported rice was 7 percent and occurred three-months after implementation. When faced with 
increases in the tariff-rate, households decrease their consumption of imported rice. Households that 
face greater exposure to the tariff rate decrease their consumption more than those that are less 
exposed. The relatively small tariff pass-through and the responsiveness of consumption to increases 
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1. Introduction  
            During the past several decades, rice has become an increasingly popular grain in Nigeria, 
outpacing traditional staples like cassava in consumption and expenditure. Despite developments in 
the domestic rice industry, rising population and increasing per capita consumption of rice have 
contributed to the country’s growing gap between domestic demand and supply. To meet domestic 
demand, Nigeria has become one of the world’s largest importers of rice. The country’s large rice 
import bill has become the face of Nigeria’s food security problem, and thus has received a high degree 
of government and public attention. The Government of Nigeria (GON) has attempted to become 
self-sufficient in rice production through investments in the development of the rice industry and the 
implementation of protective trade tariffs and bans.  
Since the 1980’s, rice has faced varying levels of trade protection. Changes in the tariff rate 
have been frequent and large, ranging from a zero percent tariff rate during the 2008 Food Crisis to 
110 percent in 2013-2014. Following trade literature, I expect tariffs to be passed through as higher 
market prices for imported rice and local rice. This assumption is complicated by the presence of tariff 
evasion and widespread smuggling of rice, particularly across the Nigeria-Benin border.  
Utilizing data from Nigeria’s National Bureau of Statistics Retail Prices for Select Goods and the 
General Household Survey (2010, 2012-2013, 2015-2016), this paper exploits the changes in the tariff 
rate to examine how shifts in the tariff rate impact domestic retail prices for imported and local rice 
and household welfare. This effect is analyzed through two main lenses. First, I examine the pass 
through of the tariff on state-level retail prices of imported rice. Second, I exploit heterogeneity in the 
baseline community-level consumption and production of rice to identify which regions in the country 
are more exposed to changes in the tariff rate. Thus, I can examine the relative changes in the 
consumption and production of rice in comparison to the national trend due to tariff changes.  
I find that the tariff pass-through for imported rice is relatively small, around 7 percent, and 
non-instantaneous. The pass-through rate is lower than that found in other countries (Nacita 2009, 
Jara and Ganoza (2013)). The household level regressions find that households decrease their 
consumption of imported rice and total when faced with higher tariff rates. There is weak evidence 
that households consume more local rice when faced with higher tariffs.  
This paper is organized as follow. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 provides a 




import policy. Section 4 develops the theoretical framework. Section 5 introduces the data. Section 6 
provides the empirical strategy. Section 7 discusses the results and the implications for future policy.  
 
2. Literature Review  
My paper is related to the following fields of literature 1) the effectiveness of trade policy in 
protecting domestic industry, 2) tariff pass through, 3) the effects of changes in food prices on 
household welfare.   
Research has generally concluded that when tariff rates on agricultural commodities are increased, 
rural producers benefit from the decreased competition of imported products with local production, 
while urban households lose due to the higher prices of imported products (Taylor et al. 2007). An 
opposing argument is that agricultural support given to developing countries negatively impacts rural 
welfare by depressing the world price for locally produced goods (World Bank 2003). The main 
argument for why protective trade policy is beneficial for less-developed countries (LDCs) is that 
developed countries have a comparative advantage in grain production, thus, without protective trade 
policy, producers in LDCs are left vulnerable to competition from foreign producers. There is no 
clear-cut argument in support of this claim because rural households that are net producers benefit 
while net consumers lose from the higher prices. Taylor et al. 2007 examines the potential impact of 
the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) on rural welfare in El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, and Nicaragua. The authors find that lower tariffs for agricultural products reduce nominal 
incomes for almost all households, but the lower tariffs also reduce food prices and consumption 
costs. The net impact on households is positive, suggesting that the pre-CAFTA protective agricultural 
import policy has a detrimental impact on rural household welfare.  
Kareem (2014) finds that the Common External Tariff of the Economic Community of West 
African States has a positive impact on household welfare in Nigeria. Reductions in domestic prices 
outweigh income losses, the benefits are disproportionately felt by poor households and those who 
live near the ports. A small field of research has studied the impact of Nigeria’s import bans on 
household welfare. Treichel et al. (2012) finds that the removal of import bans will decrease poverty 
in Nigeria by 9.4 percent and lift 3.3 million people out of poverty. Dabalen and Nguyen (2016) find 
a more conservative estimate for the removal of import bans quantified as a 2.6 percentage point 
decrease in the poverty rate. Bensassi et al. (2016) finds that when agricultural import bans are 
implemented prices increase; price increases are larger in non-border areas than border areas that have 




The degree to which households are impacted by changes in the tariff rate depends on what 
percentage of the tariff rate passes through to market prices. Tariff pass-through is highly variable 
across countries and products. Nacita (2009) finds a 33 percent pass-through of tariffs on agricultural 
products in Mexico. Jara and Ganoza (2013) find a 74 percent pass-through of tariffs on imported 
yellow corn to wholesale prices of yellow corn in Peru, and a 22 percent pass-through to chicken meat. 
Chicken producers are the largest consumers of yellow corn in Peru. Duran and LaFleur (2008) find 
an 8 percent pass-through of tariffs for a group of food products in Chile. In sum, these papers find 
wide variation of tariff pass-through.  
I expect the tariff pass-through in Nigeria to be on the lower-end of the pass-through rates found 
in other research because of the presence of tariff evasion and smuggling in Nigeria. Dorosh and 
Malek (2016) examine how changes in the rice tariff rate are passed on to consumers in Nigeria 
between 2008 and 2013. Their analysis focuses solely on the state of Enugu. The authors do not find 
a specific pass-through rate, they only state that the pass-through rate is partial and decreasing from 
2008 to 2013. Their conclusion is drawn from a single state, and therefore may not be respresentative 
of the country-wide tariff pass-through rate. This paper thus expands our understanding of pass-
through rates in Nigeria.  
Takeshima and Masias (2013) find that a 1 naira increase in the border price of rice increases the 
price of local rice by 0.20 naira, suggesting that local rice is an imperfect substitute for imported rice 
and therefore domestic producers benefit marginally from tariff increases. This implies that 
households consuming imported and local rice are impacted, and that households may substitute a 
portion of their consumption of imported rice for local rice. My paper is most similar to Takeshima 
and Masias (2013) in that we both examine the impact of changes in the tariff rate on prices of rice, 
but our time frame of interest and empirical techniques differ.  
 
3. Statement of the Problem  
The development of Nigeria’s oil industry in the 1960’s and 1970’s created attractive wages 
drawing workers away from the agricultural sector and slowing food production. To meet demand for 
food, Nigeria began importing foodstuff.  The country’s exports of a single product contributed to 
the development of a “resource curse,” making food imports even more attractive.1 Since the 1980’s, 
                                                
1	Nigeria’s petroleum exports have created a “resource curse” for the country. Resource curses 




food imports have grown at an annual rate of 3.4 percent, out-pacing population growth (Onwuka 
2017).  Rice imports have accounted for a large proportion of food imports. Population growth, higher 
incomes, rapid urbanization, and shifting grain preferences, coupled with slow transformation in the 
domestic rice industry drastically increased Nigerian demand for rice and, in turn, imports (Cadoni 
and Angelucci 2013). Rice’s importance in the modern Nigerian diet and its large import bill has led 
to rice becoming the face of the country’s food security issues.  
 
3.1 Domestic Production and Consumption of Rice 
Although Nigeria is the largest producer of rice in West Africa, the country has a shortage in 
domestic production due to the country’s growing population and per capita consumption and the 
local industry’s low productivity. Nigeria’s rice production is centered in the country’s subhumid 
middle belt, with some additional production in the humid south and semiarid north. Map 1 illustrates 
the geographic distribution of rice production in 2001, highlighting the dominance of the middle belt 
and some of the northern regions in rice production.  
The Government of Nigeria has made investments to augment the sector’s productivity, although 
the investments are relatively small in comparison to investments in neighboring countries.2 In 
response to the food crisis in the 1980’s, Nigeria introduced structural adjustment programs (1985) to 
create state-level programs that focused on small-scale agricultural production. For rice, the priority 
area was investment in irrigation systems. In 1999, the National Economic Empowerment and 
Development Strategy (NEEDS) was created to boost social and economic growth in the country. 
The agricultural component of NEEDS focused on generating 6 percent annual economic growth in 
agricultural GDP and becoming 95 percent self-sufficient in food production (Gyimah-Brempong et 
al. 2016). In 2002, the Presidential Initiative on Rice was announced with the goal of becoming 
completely independent in rice production by 2005. To achieve self-sufficiency, the GON focused on 
supplying subsidized rice technology to increase the productivity of farmers. Increased technology 
was coupled with the proposal of new milling plants, the dissemination of higher quality seeds, and an 
                                                
exchange reserves during global prices increases or export spikes. Large foreign exchange reserves 
and temporary increases in export volume appreciate the domestic currency, making food imports 
more attractive. Cheaper imports undercut domestic producers, reducing the profitability of the 
domestic agricultural industry. Nigeria has struggled with its “resource curse” since the development 
of the oil industry due to the country’s poor governance (Gyimah-Brembong et al. (2016)).	
2	During the 2000’s, Nigeria lagged behind Benin, Ghana, and Niger in yield per hectare. Nigeria’s 




increased import tariff on foreign white rice (Cadoni and Angelucci 2013). The Presidential Initiative 
on Rice was followed by a wave of investments into the domestic rice industry, including the World 
Bank’s National Fadama Development Project (2005), the National Rice Development Strategy and 
Market Stabilization (2008-2010), the Presidential Transformation Agenda (2011), and the Agricultural 
Promotion Policy (APP) (Gyimah-Brempong et al. 2016). 
Rising demand and government investments have contributed to the growth of the domestic 
industry. Figure 1 illustrates the change in Nigeria’s rice paddy production and area harvested from 
1970 to 2015. The growth has generally followed an upward trend, with some points of acceleration 
and deceleration. In the mid-1980’s, when the government created the structural adjustment programs 
and implemented a complete import ban on rice, there was a rapid growth in production. In the early 
2000’s, when the Presidential Initiative on Rice was enacted, there was another acceleration in 
production. Yield across the time period has not followed an upward trend; however, it is possible 
that declines in average yield occurred due to the addition of new, more marginal rice farming land.  
  Investments in the domestic rice industry have aided in production growth, but they have 
failed to create independence in production. Figure 2 illustrates domestic production, foreign imports, 
and population growth from 1961 to 2015. In line with Figure 1, production has increased throughout 
the time period; however, growth in production has occurred at a slower rate than population growth. 
To meet demand, rice imports were introduced in the mid-1970’s and have generally experienced 
positive growth since then. While the rice availability, the sum of imports and production, has trended 
up at a slightly slower pace than population, per capita demand for rice has also steadily grown 
throughout the time period. Therefore, Figure 2 fails to capture the rising per capita demand, and, in 
turn, the true gap between supply and demand. 
The inability to keep pace with the domestic demand for rice is rooted in the low productivity of 
rice farming throughout the country. To reduce Nigeria’s rice yield gap, there needs to be increased 
investment and uptake of technology mixed with better access to seeds, fertilizers, irrigation, and 
protection of crops (“Nigeria seeking” 2019).  
 
3.2 Imports of Foreign Rice  
At present, Nigeria is Africa’s largest importer of rice, and one of the world’s biggest importers. 
The majority of the country’s rice imports come from Thailand, Vietnam, and India (Gyimah-
Brempong et al. 2016). Imports are mainly brought in through Nigeria’s largest ports: Port Lagos and 




How much rice Nigeria actually imports is a point of discrepancy. Table 1, adapted from Dorosh 
and Malek (2016) portrays imports from five different sources. Between 2008 and 2010, Nigeria’s 
officially reported imports (column 1) are substantially lower than the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAOSTAT) and the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) import levels 
(columns 2 and 3). During this period, official imports are only 30 percent of FAOSTAT’s imports 
(column 6). There is also a discrepancy between the United Nation’s COMTRADE mirror trade data 
during the 2008-2010 period. Exports to Nigeria (column 5), as reported by rice-exporting countries 
like Thailand and Vietnam, are about four times larger than reported imports (column 4). The 
discrepancies in the COMTRADE mirror data and the low-level of officially reported imports are 
suggestive of tariff evasion.  
Inconsistencies between the stated and the calculated tariff also point to tariff evasion. Table 2, 
taken from Dorosh and Malek (2016), utilizes government reported imports, gross tariff revenue, and 
import prices to calculate the average tariff collected for the 2007-2011 time period.  Across all rice 
varieties in 2007 and 2008, the calculated tariff is nearly four times the stated tariff rate, suggesting 
that official imports grossly underreport actual imports. The discrepancies between the calculated 
average tariff (column 6) and the stated tariff rate in combination with the large annual fluctuations 
draw into question the validity of government reported imports and tariff revenue. When Dorosh and 
Malek (2016) recalculate the average tariff collected utilizing the COMTRADE exports to Nigeria 
instead of official imports, they find that the applied tariff rate is actually much lower than the official 
tariff rate. Qualitative evidence illustrating the existence of tariff evasion is limited; however, 
quantitative evidence highlights the extensiveness of the problem. Legal cases brought against former 
Nigerian Customs Service officers and major rice importers provide a qualitative backing for this 
argument.3 
Nigeria also suffers from smuggling, mainly across its long and historically porous borders with 
Benin and Nigeria (Golub 2012). Like tariff evasion, it is inherently difficult to quantify the rate at 
                                                
3	In 2009, Nigerian police officers brought a case against the former Nigerian customs chief for 
aiding three Indian businessmen in evading $17 million, or 2.5 billion naira, in rice import duties. 
The three businessmen, the Vaswani brothers, operated under the Stallion Group brand (“Nigeria 
charges”). The Stallion Group has faced several lawsuits for their refusal to pay duties on rice 
imports. In 2014, the Stallion Group and three other major rice imports abused a special quota that 
allowed approved imports of rice up to a certain quota to pay a lower 10% duty and 20% levy in 
comparison to the 10% duty and the 60% levy that was normally to be paid. In 2015, customs sealed 
the premises of the four importers after they refused to pay back 23.6 billion naira in unpaid tariffs 




which rice is smuggled into Nigeria and if smuggled rice is disseminated across the country. Benin, 
Nigeria’s western neighbor, is known to import many goods which face high tariffs or bans in Nigeria. 
Golub (2012) finds that Benin imports 10 times as many products that are banned in Nigeria than its 
neighboring country of Togo, despite similar population sizes and demographics. 
Benin also appears to import large quantities of rice to be smuggled into Nigeria. Figure 3 
illustrates imports to Nigeria and Benin from 2001 to 2010. Nigeria and Benin’s import quantities 
move in almost perfect opposition. From 2001 to 2006, Nigeria’s imports fell by approximately 
800,000 tons and Benin’s increased by 650,000 tons, suggesting that reductions in imported rice in 
Nigeria are met with increases in smuggled rice from Benin. 
The parboiled rice imported to Benin, dubbed “Cotonou Rice,” is re-exported to areas facing 
shortages in Nigeria, particularly border regions and Lagos (Hashim and Meagher 1999). Between 
2004 and 2006, Benin’s rice imports nearly doubled. In this period, Nigeria’s tariff rate was 100 percent 
in 2004 and 2005 and 50 percent in 2006, while Benin’s tariff rate was only 8.75. From 2004 to 2006, 
Benin imported enough rice to meet demand for a population of approximately 130 million people, 
despite only having a population of 10 million (Ogunkula 2010). News and government reports of 
seizures of smuggled rice are further evidence of the problem.4  
The widespread tariff evasion and smuggling lead to underreporting of imports and reduce the 
average tariff collected on rice. If rice is passing into the country without paying the stated tariff rate, 
I expect the average tariff rate to be a fraction of the stated tariff rate. A lower average tariff rate, is 
translated into a smaller increase in market rice prices. Thus, tariff evasion and smuggling undermine 
the goal of protective tariff policy.  
 
3.3 Import Tariff Rate  
Since the 1980’s Nigeria has pursued protective import policy for rice. Figure 4 illustrates the 
country’s rice imports and bans from 1990 to 2018, as reported by the United Nations TRAINS 
database and United States Department of Agriculture’s GAIN reports. The UN TRAINS database 
                                                
4	In April of 2019, the Chairman of the Rice Processors Association of Nigeria (RIPAN), 
Mohammed Maifata, claimed that one million metric tons of rice had been smuggled into Nigeria 
over a three-month span. Maifata cried for the government to combat smuggling, stating that the 
rice processing companies cannot survive with the inflow of cheap foreign rice, and without millers, 
paddy farmers will no one to sell their rice to. RIPAN worries that if action is not taken, the country 
will eventually fall victim to a national food crisis and will not have a domestic agricultural industry 




reported a lower tariff than the USDA GAIN reports for the 2010 to 2014. I utilize the higher tariff 
rate report by the USDA GAIN report because the UN TRAINS database has a reputation of not 
reporting special tariffs applied on products (Anderson and van Wincoop 2004).  
As shown, the GON has been widely inconsistent with its policy regarding rice imports, often 
enacting policy at the influence of internal or external businesses involved in the rice industry. 
Following the removal of the 1986 ban on rice in 1995, the tariff rate hovered around 100 percent 
before being reduced to 50 percent in 2005. Between May and September of 2008, the tariff on rice 
was dropped to zero in an attempt to mitigate high food prices resulting from the 2008 Food Crisis. 
Since the food crisis, the tariff rate has experienced a series of increases. In July 2014, the rice import 
tariff rate was lowered to 20 percent for mill owners and 60 percent for traders, with an additional 10 
percent special tariff. In July of 2015, rice was removed from the foreign exchange market, along with 
40 other items, meaning that traders cannot access the foreign exchange market to fund their 
purchases of rice.5 In October of 2015, the Forex ban was lifted for land imports. The full ban was 
put back in place in February 2016 due to the increased presence of rice smuggling across land borders.  
The inconsistency of the government’s trade policy, draws into question how effective tariffs are, 
especially if their intention is to provide protection to and grow the domestic rice industry. In the next 
section, I develop a theoretical model of trade to examine the implications of tariffs.  
 
4. Theoretical Framework  
The impact of tariffs on domestic retail prices depends on the cost of legally and illegally imported 
rice, the substitutability of imported rice with local products, and the cost of these substitutes. The 
cost of local rice and imported rice will vary across states depending on the proximity to rice producing 
regions and to the main importing regions, the southern Port Lagos and Port Harcourt. Assuming 
Nigeria is a small open economy, the price at the port in Nigeria is the world rice price. Because 
Nigeria imports about 60 percent of its rice from Thailand, I will utilize the White Broken Thai rice 
price to represent the world price. At the market-level, consumers face an imported rice price that is 
a function of the world price, the tariff rate, trade-costs, and a market-specific mark-up. Local rice is 
an imperfect substitute for imported rice (Dorosh and Malek 2016, Akaeze 2010).  
                                                
5	Decreasing oil prices have limited Nigeria’s revenue, making it more difficult for the country to 
repay its financial commitments. To secure the availability of foreign currency, President Buhari 
placed a restriction on foreign exchange access for 41 imports goods. The president deemed these 




When the GON increases the tariff rate, I expect a portion of the tariff to be passed on to 
consumers in the form of higher market price for imported rice. Since local rice is a close, but 
imperfect substitute for imported rice, a proportion of consumers will substitute some or all of their 
consumption of imported rice for local rice. As demand for local rice rises, the price of local rice will 
also rise. Net producers of local rice will benefit from the increase in the price of local rice. Higher 
prices for local rice may incentivize increased domestic production of rice.  
The model is complicated with the introduction of the possibility of tariff evasion and smuggling. 
Tariff evasion lowers the average tariff rate being paid on rice, and thus the pass-through to imported 
and local prices. Smuggling introduces a third option where consumers have the choice between 
consuming legally imported rice, illegally imported rice, and locally produced rice. Assuming 
consumers cannot differentiate between illegally and legally imported rice, smuggled rice is a perfect 
substitute for legally imported rice.  
The theoretical model can be extended to look at the impact of high tariffs on households. The 
impact of tariffs on households depends on whether they are net producers or consumers, the price 
of imported and local rice, and the substitutability of imported rice with other products. If tariffs pass-
through to domestic prices, we would expect net producers to benefit from tariffs and net consumers 
to lose. Net producers benefit as the price of imported rice rises leading consumers to substitute 
imported rice with locally produced rice, causing the price of local rice to increase. Net consumers 
lose as the price of imported rice rises. Households substitute a portion of their consumption to close 
substitutes, but the rise in prices causes household real income to fall, leading to a reduction in welfare.  
As the theoretical discussion has shown, the impact of tariffs is dependent on a number of factors. I 
will test if these theoretical models hold in the following sections.  
 
5. Data  
This paper utilizes two main sources of data: National Bureau of Statistics’ (NBS) Retail Prices for 
Select Goods (2001-2018) and the Nigerian General Household Survey (2010, 2012-2013, 2015-2016). 
The NBS retail data provides monthly, state-level market prices for select food and retail items. An 




the missing data for the rural line, only the urban data series is utilized.6 The retail goods analyzed 
varies across the years; however, prices for imported and local rice, maize, gari, cassava, and yams are 
collected for all of the years. I also collected additional data on the rice tariff rate (UNCTAD TRAINS 
database and USDA GAIN Reports), exchange rate (FRED), Thai rice prices (FAO), and travel 
distances (Globe Feed Distance Calculator).  
The General Household Survey (GHS) is a panel of 5,000 households that collects detailed 
information on household food consumption, food purchases, and agricultural production, along with 
demographic information, market food prices, and community-level variables.7 Households are 
selected in a multi-stage random sampling procedure from the 36 states and the Federal Capital 
Territory. Three waves of the survey have been produced, in 2010, 2012-2013, and 2015-2016. For 
each wave, surveys were conducted during the post-planting and post-harvest period.  
 
5.1 Rice Prices  
The NBS Retail Prices for Select Goods includes prices for imported and local rice, as well as 
other grain substitutes like gari, maize, and yams, for each of Nigeria’s 36 states and the Federal Capital 
Territory. Summary price statistics are shown in Table 3.  The average nominal price of imported rice 
has risen from 64 naira per kilogram in 2001 to 287 in 2016. Nominal local prices have also increased, 
but at a slower rate than imported prices. The average nominal price of local rice was 51 naira per kg 
in 2001 and 195 in 2016. Competing grains like white and yellow gari have followed similar price 
patterns, while maize, yams, and brown beans followed similar growth until 2015 when they 
experienced large price hikes.8  
Generally, the prices of imported, local, and Thai rice track each other closely, as shown in Figure 
5. While market import prices appear to be rooted in the world price, the large gap between the world 
price and the market price is suggestive of large transport, tariff, and mark-up costs. Research has 
found that price transmission for world rice prices to Nigerian urban prices for imported and local 
                                                
6	Regressions run utilizing the NBS price data will only examine the rice tariff pass-through to urban 
retail rice prices. The impact of the tariff rate on rural areas will only be examined using the GHS 
data.  
7	The General Household Survey is an annual cross-sectional survey of 22,000 Nigerian households. 
In 2010, a sub-sample was selected and given a more extensive survey. This sub-sample now forms 
the panel survey.  
8	It would be ideal if the NBS price data tracked the same products during the 2001-2018 period so 





rice is strong (Hatzenbuehler et al. 2017). In the graph, Thai prices tend to lead the local and imported 
prices, which is to be expected given that it takes time for local markets to price in world changes.  
 
5.2 Household Data 
The GHS panel survey includes surveys at the household, agricultural, and community level. The 
household level survey includes sections on expenditures, education, income, and demographics.  
Table 4 shows baseline household summary statistics at the rural and urban levels. 42 percent of all 
households consume local rice and 55 percent consume imported rice. A higher proportion of urban 
households report consumption of imported rice than rural households, and the opposite trend exists 
for local rice. Only 5 percent of households report consumption of imported and local rice in the 
previous seven days, this is likely a lower bound of the number of households that consume both 
imported and local rice. Approximately 9.2 percent of rural households and 1.8 percent of urban 
households report consuming some of their own production.  
The expenditure surveys include a seven-day recall of food purchases, spending, consumption, 
and consumption of own production. Rice also accounts for a large proportion of household food 
expenditure (see Table 5). Household expenditure on local rice as a percentage of total expenditure 
increased from 2010 - 2015 in both rural and urban areas, while imported rice decreased. For both 
rural and urban households, food expenditure is the majority of total household expenditure; food is 
73 percent of rural expenditure and 62 percent of urban expenditure.  
 
5.3 Data Limitations 
There are concerns about the validity of the seven-day food recall from the GHS. In the first 
survey, 2010 Post-Planting, surveyors were not given any standards to utilize when measuring the food 
items. Rough conversions were provided to convert the measurements into a standard unit, grams. 
Since the first survey, a list of units, photo guides, and a conversion file have been added. In the 2015-
2016 survey, state specific conversion rates were included. Even with more steps taken to standardize 
measurements, there are still concerns about measurement error. Image 1 shows three different sizes 





I initially wanted to use price data from the household and community surveys.9 The utilization of 
prices faced by communities would allow for a better analysis of the impacts of changes in the tariff 
rate on household real income and welfare. However, when the community-market prices for rice 
were calculated utilizing the provided conversions, there was an unreasonable and unrealistic variation 
in prices. The average community market price was in line with the prices in the NBS data; however, 
the variation in the community level market prices would introduce large measurement errors in my 
models. The variation in prices is likely coming from differences in the way food was measured, errors 
with the conversion rates, discounts from bulk purchases, and data entry problems. Due to the 
measurement issues, the price data will not be utilized for any major analysis.  A similar concern exists 
for the consumption data; however, there was less variation in the household per capita consumption 
of rice.  
 
6. Empirical Strategy  
In this section, the objective is to estimate the extent to which the rice tariff passes through to 
state-level, market prices of imported rice between 2001 and 2018. Given the importance of rice in 
the Nigerian diet, I will also measure the degree to which tariff increases translate to changes in 
household consumption.  
 
6.1 Tariff Pass-Through Model  
This paper will follow the theoretical framework utilized by Nicita (2009). The market price 
(!"#)	faced by households in state s at time t can be modeled as a function of local substitutes prices 
('"#), the world price ( #), the tariff ()#), and trade costs (*"#).  
1 	!"# = '"#- ((# 1 + )# *"#)/0-	` 
1 − 2 represents the degree to which world prices, tariffs, and trade costs pass through to market 
prices. In other words, 1 − 2 represents the tariff pass-through. Equation 1 rewritten utilizing logs is 
shown below.  
2 ln 	!"# = 2 ln '"# + 1 − 2 67(# + 1 − 2 ln 1 + )# + 1 − 2 67*"# 
Following Nicita (2009) and Jara and Ganoza (2013), I utilize distance from the ports to 
estimate trade costs. Nigeria has two main ports of entry, Port Lagos and Port Harcourt. I construct 
                                                





trade cost as the shortest distance between each state’s capital and the nearest port, either Port Lagos 
or Part Harcourt. Nicita (2009) assumes that trade costs are constant across the time period of interest.  
Given my wide period of interest, 2001 to 2018, the same assumption may not be appropriate. 
However, I assume that trade costs are constant across the period of interest, and the inclusion of a 
state-time trend captures any trade costs, allowing me to drop the trade costs from the model.  
A flexible form of equation (2), which allows 1-	2 to differ in both sign and magnitude is 
represented as 
3 ln 	!"# = 9: + 9/ ln '"# + 9; ln (# + < ln 1 + )# +9=67*"# + >? + ># + >"@ + A"# 
where >? is state fixed-effects, ># is time fixed-effects, >"@ is a state-time trend and A#" is the error 
term. The main coefficient of interest is < which is the tariff pass-through elasticity. If there is perfect 
pass-through, < will equal 1. If < < 1, then the pass-through is only partial.  
One concern with the above regression is that the local substitute prices may be endogenous. 
Following Nicita (2009), I use the two-year lagged values as an instrument for the local price. While 
using lagged values is not an ideal instrument, the use of the instrumental variable will reduce some of 
the endogeneity concerns.  I will run specification (3) using both ordinary least-squares (OLS) and 
two stage least-squares (2SLS). 
There is significant heterogeneity in state production of rice across Nigeria. Depending on a 
state’s share of the national rice production in the period before my time-frame of interest, states are 
exposed to changes in the rice tariff rate differently. I utilize this variation in exposure by first 









where *?;::: is the quantity of rice production (thousand tons) in state s in the year 2000, *?;:::J  
is the production of rice across the country in the year 2000 measured in thousand tons, K	is the 
total area of the country (km2), and K? is the total area of state s (km2).  
Then, I interact the state’s share of total rice production (weighted by the area of the state) 
calculated above with the tariff rate levied on imported rice in time t, )#, to construct a measure of 










I use this new measure of tariff exposure to run the following OLS specification:  




where '#" is the local substitute price for state s at time t, (# is the world price at time t, >? is state 
fixed-effects, ># is year fixed effects, and >"@	is a state time trend. The standard errors are clustered by 
states.  
I reshape the NBS Retail Prices for Select Items into a state-month panel of 36 states and the 
Federal Capital Territory for 216 months (18 years). State-level fixed effects account for all state-
specific time-invariant characteristics while year-fixed effects control for time variation in variables 
that do not differ by state. Each model is also run with the stated tariff rate, the one-month lagged 
tariff rate, the two-month lagged tariff rate, and the three-month tariff lag. Changes in the tariff rate 
take time to implement, and there is likely a lag in when changes in the tariff rate impacts consumers. 
Thus, I believe the three-month lagged tariff rate is the best measurement of the tariff rate.  
 
6.2 Measurement of Exposure to Tariff Changes  
Rice import tariffs are implemented on the national level; however, there is substantial 
heterogeneity in per capita rice consumption across the states. Depending on a state’s per capita 
consumption of rice, some states are more exposed to changes in the tariff rate. If the national tariff 
rate for imported rice is utilized, I do not capture the true variation in exposure to tariff rates.  
To try to account for variation in state-level exposure to rice import tariffs, I measure exposure as 
the relative per capita rice consumption in state s relative to the per capita rice consumption of the 










where OP"P  is the sum of household rice consumption of all households h in state s during the 
baseline year, OPP  is the sum of household rice consumption of all households h in the country, Q  
is the population of the country in the baseline, and Q? is the population of the state in the baseline. 
 I interact the per capita rice consumption in state s relative to the whole country with the tariff 










By using per-capita consumption shares from before the tariff changes of interest, my measure of 
tariff exposure is not impacted by endogenous changes in rice consumption that take place due to 




 A similar measure of tariff exposure is created utilizing the state’s share of total rice production 
weighted by the total area of the state. This tariff exposure measurement is identical to the one 
developed in equations (4) and equations (5), except the state level rice production from 2006 was 
utilized. The 2006 rice production data was the most recent data available. I assume that the 
distribution of rice cultivation across states remained the same from 2006 to the period right before 
the first GHS survey was conducted in 2010.  
 
6.3 Effect of tariff exposure on household consumption  
The research question I seek to answer is how changes in the tariff rate affect household 
consumption of rice. My regression framework relies on comparing households in states that are more 
or less exposed to changes in the tariff rate.  
I start by reshaping the data from GHS to create a household-survey panel dataset, utilizing the 
three waves of surveys conducted at both the post-planting and post-harvest time period. I utilize the 
household seven-day recall of food consumption to construct a measure of household consumption 
of imported, local, and total rice; 	ST7UVWX@YT7ZP"#  is the consumption of item i for household h in 
state s at time t.  
I start by running a base specification ordinary least-squares (OLS) using the national tariff, )#, for 
imported rice: 
	 9 	ST7UVWX@YT7ZP"# = 2 + \)# + ]^P# + <" + AP"# 
the main coefficient of interest is \, which shows the average change in seven-day per capita 
consumption of rice item i when the tariff changes. I include a vector of household covariates, ^P#, 
that may impact household rice consumption, including household per capita expenditures, religion10, 
if the head of the household has a higher education11, if the house produces any of the rice it consumes, 
rainfall, and a rural dummy. The state fixed-effects, <", control for time-invariant differences across 
states.  
                                                
10	The religion categories are Christian, Islam, and Other Religion. According to the 2010 Post-
Planting survey, the Christian, Islam, and Other Religion shares are, respectively, 55 percent, 43 
percent, and 1.5 percent.	 
11	Higher education includes any individual with teacher training, vocational/technical school, NCE, 




A similar specification is run using the level of tariff exposure experienced by state s in time t, 
L"#,	instead of the stated tariff rate, )#. This allows me to compare households in states that were more 
or less exposed to changes in the tariff rate. I estimate the following specification using OLS:  
	 10 	ST7UVWX@YT7ZP"# = 2 + 9L"# + ]^P# + <" + ># + AP"# 
Similar to the previous specification, I control for a vector of household covariates, ^P#, state fixed-
effects, <", and year fixed effects, >#. I also run the same specification but include state-specific time 
trends. The specification with state-specific time trends is:  
	 11 	ST7UVWX@YT7ZP"# = 2 + 9L"# + ]^P# + <" + ># + >"@	+AP"# 
I assume that changes in the tariff rate are uncorrelated with state and time specific, unobservable 
shocks that would influence household consumption of rice. Since I utilize household per capita rice 
consumption from the baseline period and state rice production from 2006 to construct my tariff 
measure, any bias impacting L"# would need to be correlated with the relative per capita rice 
consumption in the baseline period and the change in the rice tariff rate.  
The household per capita consumption is likely to suffer from measurement error. First, the 
household per capita consumption is calculated by a seven-day expenditure recall survey. Households 
that do not consume rice daily may have worse recall than house that regularly consume rice for meals. 
Secondly, all per capita consumption is measured in grams (g); however, households reported their 
consumption in different units. Even though unit conversions were provided, it is likely that the 
conversions are imprecise.  
 
7. Results 
7.1 Tariff Pass-Through  
Table 6 and 7 report the estimates for the tariff pass-through model. First, an OLS model 
following equation (3) is run. To address the concern that the local substitute prices are endogenous, 
the same model is running utilizing the two-year lagged values of the local substitute price. While it 
would be ideal to utilize other data to instrument for the local substitute prices, the first-stage results 
indicate that the two-year lagged values are a valid instrument. Results are given for the tariff rate, and 
for each of its one month lags.  
Column 4 of Table 6 shows that there is a 7 percent pass-through of the rice tariff rate to imported 




pass-through of 7.9 percent. In both models, local substitute price and the world price have significant, 
positively correlated relationships with the imported rice price. 
The 7 to 8 percent rice tariff pass-through is smaller than the tariff pass-through found for 
agricultural products in other countries. Nicita (2009) finds a 33 percent pass-through rate for 
agricultural products in Mexico. Duran and LaFleur (2011) find a tariff pass-through rate of 8 percent 
for a cluster of food products in Chile. Given the evidence of tariff evasion and smuggling in Nigeria, 
a tariff pass-through of 7 percent is reasonable.  
Table 8 reports the OLS results utilizing the production-based measure of tariff-exposure. The 
results indicate a positive and significant relationship between the state-level tariff measure and the 
change in the state price of imported rice. The positive coefficient suggests that districts that are more 
exposed to tariff changes (based on their 2000 production of rice), experience a larger increase in the 
price of imported rice than the national trend. States that experienced the average change in tariff 
protection have a tariff pass-through 4.6 percent greater than the national baseline, as shown in 
column 4 of Table 8. Similar to Table 6 and Table 7, local rice and Thai rice prices have a positive 
and significant relationship with the price of imported rice.  
 
7.2 Household Consumption  
After demonstrating that changes in the tariff rate have a positive and significant impact on the 
price of imported rice, I seek to show that household consumption of rice is also impacted by the 
changes in the tariff rate and the related price changes. I utilize household seven-day consumption of 
imported rice measured in grams, as reported in the seven-day food expenditure survey of the GHS, 
as my dependent variable.  
I start by running my base OLS specification, as reported in Table 9. Across all four tariff 
variables, I find that increases in the tariff rate are negatively associated with household consumption 
of imported rice. For the tariff rate (column 1), the tariff rate lagged one month (column 2), and the 
tariff rate lagged two months (column 3), a one percentage point increase in the tariff rate is associated 
with a 3.2 to 3.6-gram reduction in a household’s seven-day consumption of imported rice. For the 
tariff rate lagged three months (column 4), a one percentage point increase in the tariff rate is 
associated with a 23-gram reduction in a household’s seven-day consumption of imported rice. The 
average household consumes approximately 2.5 kilograms of rice over a seven-day period. Thus, a 
one percentage point increase in the tariff rate on rice is associated with a .9 percent reduction in a 




I utilize the same specification to examine how changes in the tariff rate impact household 
consumption of local rice (Table 10) and total rice (Table 11). Using the tariff rate (column 1), tariff 
rate lagged one month (column 2), and the tariff rate lagged two months (column 3), I find that a one 
percentage point increase in the tariff rate is associated with an approximately 7.5 gram increase in 
household seven-day local rice consumption (Table 10). Following the theoretical framework, I expect 
that as the tariff rate on imported rice increases household consumption of local rice increases. The 
results from columns 1-3 of Table 10 support this argument. However, when the three month lagged 
tariff rate is utilized, there is a negative coefficient on the tariff rate. This indicates that as the tariff 
rate increases household consumption of local rice declines. The negative coefficient on the tariff rate 
may be a sign that there are changes occurring in Nigerian rice consumption that are not accounted 
for in this model.  
Household total rice consumption decreases in response to an increase in the tariff rate (see 
column 4 of Table 11). When the tariff rate rises, part of the higher tariff rate is passed on to 
consumers in the form of higher imported rice prices. Households lower their total rice consumption 
when faced with higher rice prices.  
I run the same specification again, but instead of using the national tariff level, I utilize the 
state-specific tariff exposure, as specified in equation (10). The OLS results in Table 12 indicate a 
negative and significant relationship between the three-month lagged, state-level tariff measure and 
the household per capita consumption of imported rice (g). The negative coefficient found in column 
(4) suggests that households in states more exposed to changes in the rice import tariff rate decrease 
their per capita consumption of imported rice more than the national-trend.  
The same specification is run using household per capita consumption of local rice and total 
rice. I find that households in states that are more exposed to changes in the rice import tariff rate 
increase their per capita consumption of local rice more than the national trend (Table 13) and 
decrease their total per capita rice consumption more than the national trend (Table 14). These results 
suggest that households in regions that are the most exposed to rice tariff changes based off of baseline 
rice consumption substitute a portion of their imported rice consumption for local rice, but their 
overall rice consumption falls.  
To account for any state specific time trends, I add a state time trend to the tariff exposure 
model (as shown in equation (11)). When the state-specific time trend is added, the coefficient on the 




I also run the tariff exposure model using a rice production based tariff measure. The results 
for the production based tariff exposure model are presented in Table 16. I find that states that are 
more exposed to changes in the tariff rate based on their production decrease their consumption of 
imported and total rice more than the national trend. These results are in agreement with my findings 
of tariff pass-through. As shown in Table 8, states that have a higher production based exposure to 
tariff changes experience a larger pass through of tariffs to the price of imported rice.  
 
8.  Conclusions 
This paper analyzes whether changes in Nigeria’s tariff rate pass-through to market prices of 
imported rice and household consumption. To identify the tariff pass-through, I utilize a standard 
tariff pass-through model, more specifically I follow the model of Nicita (2009). I find that there is a 
7 percent pass-through of the tariff rate to imported rice prices. Tariff pass-through is greater in areas 
that are more exposed to changes in the tariff rate based off of their production. The tariff pass-
through is lower than that found in Takeshima and Masias (2013) and Nacita (2009), but in line with 
Duran and LaFleur (2011). Given Nigeria’s issues with tariff evasion and smuggling, the tariff pass-
through is reasonable.  
I also show that household consumption of imported rice decreases in response to an increase in 
the rice tariff rate. Household total rice consumption also falls, although total rice consumption 
declines by less than imported rice consumption. Households that are relatively more exposed to 
changes in the tariff rate based off of their state’s baseline rice consumption and production decrease 
their consumption of imported rice and total rice more than the national trend but increase their 
consumption of local rice more than the national trend. These findings suggest that households 
substitute a portion of their consumption of imported rice to local rice.  
Further work should be done to identify if the net losses faced by households outweigh the net 
gains received by rice producers. If the tariffs are effective in protecting and promoting the domestic 
industry, a slight decline in household welfare may be permitted to avoid large food security issues in 
the future. Nigeria should consider reducing its tariff rate to the 30-40 percent range, as suggested by 
Johnson and Dorosh (2015), to reduce the lucrativeness of smuggling rice. A reduction in the tariff 
rate needs to be coupled with further investments in increasing the productivity per hectare. Reducing 
Nigeria’s food importation bill is important for protecting Nigeria against future fluctuations in global 
commodity prices and world food crises.  





Akaeze, H. (2010). Consumer Preference for Imported Rice in Nigeria – Perceived Quality 
Differences or Habit Persistence?. Michigan State University PhD Dissertation.  
Akande, S. and Akpokodje, G. (2003). Rice Prices and Market Integration in Selected Areas in 
Nigeria: A Study Report. Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research Agricultural 
and Rural Development Department.  
Anderson, J. and van Wincoop, E. (2004). Trade Costs. Journal of Economic Literature.  
Cadoni, P. and Angelucci, F. (2013). Analysis of Incentives and Disincentives for Rice in Nigeria. 
Monitoring African Food and Agricultural Policies.  
Customs seals premises of Stallion Group and three others over 23 billion naira of rice import duty 
evasion (2015, July 29). Shipping Position Online.  
Bensassi, B., J. Jarreau, and C. Mitaritonna (2016). Informal Trade and the Price of Import Bans: 
Evidence from Nigeria.  African Growth & Development Policy Modeling Consortium.  
Dabalen, A. and N. Nguyen (2018). The Short-Run Impact of Import Bans on Poverty: The Case of 
Nigeria (2008-2012). The World Bank Economic Review, 32(2), 245-267. 
Dorosh, P. and M. Malek (2016). Rice Imports, Prices, and Challenges for Trade Policy. In K. 
Gyimah-Brempong (Ed.), M. Johnson (Ed.), and H. Takeshima (Ed.), The Nigerian rice 
economy: Policy options for transforming production, marketing, and trade (pp. 159-180). International 
Food Policy Research Institute.  
Duran, J. and LaFleur, M (2011). “Effects of Trade Opening on Household Welfare: The Chilean 
Case,” Serie Comercio Internacional No.114. United Nations Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean, Santiago de Chile.  





Grain Market Report (2014). Canary Wharf, London International Grains Council   
Gyimah-Brempong, K., Johnson, M., and Takeshima, H. (2016). Rice in the Nigerian Economy and 
Agricultural Policies. In K. Gyimah-Brempong (Ed.), M. Johnson (Ed.), and H. Takeshima 
(Ed.), The Nigerian rice economy: Policy options for transforming production, marketing, and trade (pp.1-
20). International Food Policy Research Institute.  
Hashim, Y. and Meagher, K. (1999). Cross-border Trade and the Parallel Currency Market: Trade 
and Finance in the Context of Structural Adjustment: a Case Study from Kano, Nigeria. 
Nordic Africa Institute.  
Hatzenbuehler, P. (2016). Food Security Crop Price Transmission and Formation in Nigeria. Purdue 
University PhD Dissertation.  
Jara, C. and Ganoza, A. (2013). Estimation of the pass-through and welfare effects of the tariff 
reduction for yellow corn in Peru between 2000 and 2001. Ministry of Foreign Trade and 
Tourism of Peru.  
Johnson, M. and Dorosh, P. (2015). Optimal Tariffs with Smuggling: A Spatial Analysis of Nigerian 
Rice Policy Options. International Conference of Agricultural Economists. 
Kareem, O. (2014). The Welfare Impact in Nigeria of the ECOWAS Common External Tariff: A 
Distributional Effects Analysis. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development  
Nzeka, U. (2014) Nigeria Grain and Feed Annual (GAIN Report). USDA Foreign Agricultural Services 
Nzeka, U., Taylor, J., Trego, R. (2016) Nigeria Grain and Feed Annual (GAIN Report). USDA Foreign 
Agricultural Services  
Nicita, A. (2009). The Price Effect of Tariff Liberalization: Measuring the Impact on Household 
Welfare. Journal of Development Economics, 89(1), 19-27.  
Nigeria charges ex-customs chief over import duty (2009, August 15). Reuters.  




Ogunkola, E. (2010). Nigeria: From Customs Exceptions to a Regional Trade Policy. Inter-Reseaux.  
Olaito, P. (2013) Exporter Guide for Nigeria 2013 (GAIN Report). USDA Foreign Agricultural 
 Services 
Takeshima, H. and Masias, I. (2013). Integrations of Local Rice, Imported Rice, and International 
Market. International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC.  
Treichel, V., Hoppe, M., Cadot, O., and Gourdon, J. (2012). Import Bans in Nigeria increase 
poverty. Africa trade policy notes; no 28. Washington, DC: World Bank.  
24	
Map 1: Rice Production (2001) 
 
 








Figure 1: Rice Paddy Yield, Area, and Production  
 
 














































































































Nigeria Rice Paddy Yield, Area, and Production, 1970-2015




Figure 2: Rice Supply and Population Growth  
 
 


































Table 1: Rice Imports to Nigeria, 2001-2010  
 





















Exports to Nigeria 
(thousand tons) 
(6) 
Official Imports vs. 
FAOSTAT Nigeria 
Imports 
2001  1,770 1,906 1,100 1,660  
2002  1,236 1,897 1,233 1,291  
2003  1,600 1,448 2,457 777  
2004  1,396 1,369  1,141  
2005  1,174 1,777  1,314  
2006  975 1,600 2,552 1,027  
2007  1,216 1,550 1,014 611  
2008 318 971 1,800 160 1,020 32.75% 
2009 330 1,161 2,000 398 1,415 28.42% 
2010 551 1,883 2,000 711 2,035 29.26% 
2001-2005  1,435 1,679 1,596 1,237  
2006-2010 400 1,241 1,790 967 1,222  
       
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), United States Department of Agriculture, FAOSTAT, COMTRADE United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database 





Table 2: Official Rice Imports and Tariff Revenue  
 Net Weight Value Revenue Price Average Tariff 
  ('000 tons) (bn Naira) (bn Naira) (Naira/kg) Collected             
          
Broken Rice      
2007 100 10 22 104 208% 
2008 19 1 2 43 205% 
2009 64 13 6 207 42% 
2010 2 2 1 827 39% 
2011 8 3 2 413 55% 
      
Husked (brown) rice      
2007 41 1 1 13 210% 
2008 10 0 1 40 202% 
2009 3 4 1 1,211 22% 
2010 32 12 2 370 15% 
2011 7 10 1 1,335 10% 
      
Other Milled Rice*      
2007 2,314 50 82 22 162% 
2008 318 10 20 31 203% 
2009 330 53 23 160 43% 
2010 551 61 35 110 58% 
2011 270 140 75 517 53% 
      
All Rice**      
2007 2,455 61 105 25 171% 
2008 348 11 23 32 203% 
2009 398 70 29 176 42% 
2010 585 74 38 127 51% 
2011 286 153 78 536 51% 
      
Taken from Dorosh and Malek (2016) and Johnson and Dorosh (2015)   
Notes:      
* "Milled and semi-milled rice".    




Figure 3: Nigeria and Benin Rice Imports  
 
 





















Nigeria Rice Prices and Imports, 2001-2010




Figure 4: Rice Import Tariff Rate  
 
 








Rice Tariffs and Bans, 1990-2018
Ban Rice Tariff 
1986 Ban 
July 2015: Ban from Forex Market
October 2015: Land Imports Allowed




Table 3: NBS Retail Prices for Select Items Summary Statistics 
 
  Year Mean SD Min Max 
Imported Rice 2001 64.36442 7.385941 48.92105 100 
  2006 124.4728 16.47681 77.86 208.22 
  2011 179.026 20.10073 117.681 342.8929 
  2016 287.4878 72.61787 138.5005 819.25 
Local Rice 2001 50.56087 8.020577 33.34182 80.002 
  2006 91.58389 16.95929 50 184.66 
  2011 126.4612 34.83507 78.02512 648 
  2016 195.4344 39.08311 129.3925 327.0758 
Maize 2001 36.64114 11.78456 16.782 111.1028 
  2006 54.13322 19.92055 21.04 101.52 
  2011 77.93328 52.77052 35 882.2287 
  2016 401.6123 74.30313 268.66 713.42 
White Gari 2001 54.41782 11.7473 21.67 81.55444 
  2006 69.56665 12.6421 29.35 124.49 
  2011 113.2626 55.96751 66.94 975 
  2016 265.351 70.09396 133.9375 540.4478 
Yellow Gari 2001 57.0271 16.97246 19.2 98.066 
		 2006 76.20892 14.92678 32.29 128.33 
		 2011 129.7898 61.90715 66.11 1037.5 
		 2016 332.4312 73.61312 182.6677 623.475 
White Beans 2001 54.50836 14.75441 28.50154 118.6279 
		 2006 74.33254 18.47316 35.16 123.87 
		 2011 134.5308 99.41607 68.55 1748.851 
		 2016 128.4419 16.79228 100 307.2372 
Brown Beans 2001 61.9322 14.3222 25.42333 91.66667 
		 2006 87.38184 22.63207 45 168.63 
		 2011 150.1702 26.43818 80 340.195 
		 2016 781.4214 279.4821 400 5000 
Yams  2001 39.62634 12.69418 19.00286 93.1769 
		 2006 71.9336 18.9342 31.8 139.95 
		 2011 126.4695 68.4551 38.24333 750 




Figure 5: Imported, Local, and Thai Rice Prices 
 
 






















Table:  Baseline Summary Statistics of Households 
 
 Rural  Urban  All 
 Mean  N Mean N Mean N 
 
Consumption Local Rice 
Consumption Imported Rice 
Consume Own Production 
































Higher Degree (Head of HH) 
Cultivate Land  
Work in Agriculture Sector 























































       
 
Source: Author’s Calculation using GHS 2010 Post-Planting Data 
 
Notes: Consumption of local rice and consumption of imported rice are the average number of kilograms consumed per person over the last seven days. Number of 
dependents refers to the number of household members below the age of 15. Consume Own Production refers to the percentage of households that produced at least 
part of the rice they consumed. Consume Imported & Local is the percentage of households that consumed both imported and local rice during the past 7 days. 
Higher Degree (Head of HH) is the percentage of households that have a head of household with a Bachelor’s degree or higher. Expenditure Per Person is measured 











Table 5: Household Expenditure Summary Statistics (2010 Post-Harvest) 
 
 
Table:  Summary Statistics of Household Expenditures from GHS (as Share of Total Expenditure)  
 
 2010 2013 2015 
 Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban 
       
Food Share 0.787 0.675 0.725 0.615 0.731 0.622 
Grains and Flours 0.177 0.170 0.172 0.160 0.183 0.168 
Rice - Local 0.070 0.032 0.093 0.035 0.099 0.043 
Rice - Imported 0.036 0.065 0.036 0.064 0.030 0.058 
Cassava 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.000 
Meat 0.099 0.086 0.0947 0.084 0.081 0.081 
Chicken  0.007 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.004 0.008 
Fish  0.093 0.075 0.090 0.072 0.088 0.080 
       
Nonfood  0.179 0.283 0.235 0.338 0.225 0.329 
Education  0.034 0.043 0.040 0.047 0.043 0.114 
 
Source: Author’s calculations utilizing GHS 2010 Post-Harvest data 



















Image 1: Food Measurement Example  
 











Table 6: The Effect of Tariff Changes on State Prices of Imported Rice (OLS) 
Dependent Variable:  




Tariff Lag 1 Month 
(3) 
Tariff Lag 2 Months 
(4) 
Tariff Lag 3 Months 
     
     
Local Rice 0.374*** 0.378*** 0.379*** 0.376*** 
 (0.0203) (0.0204) (0.0207) (0.0209) 
Thai Price 0.211*** 0.223*** 0.232*** 0.234*** 
 (0.0150) (0.0150) (0.0151) (0.0152) 
Tariff -0.113*** -0.00921 0.0512*** 0.0701*** 
 (0.0218) (0.0159) (0.0135) (0.0121) 
     
Constant 2.128*** 2.015*** 1.956*** 1.945*** 
 (0.0917) (0.0870) (0.0882) (0.0888) 
     
Observations 6,780 6,744 6,708 6,672 
R-squared 0.962 0.962 0.961 0.961 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
















Table 7: The Effect of Tariff Cuts on Monthly, State-Level Market Prices for Imported Rice (IV) 
 
7.1 First Stage  
Local Rice (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Tariff Tariff Lag 1 Month Tariff Lag 2 Months Tariff Lag 3 Months 
     


















Dependent Variable:     
Log(Price of Imported Rice)     
     
Local Rice 0.460*** 0.475*** 0.486*** 0.486*** 
 (0.0341) (0.0329) (0.0329) (0.0333) 
Thai Price 0.213*** 0.218*** 0.222*** 0.224*** 
 (0.0175) (0.0173) (0.0174) (0.0175) 
Tariff -0.0739*** 0.00658 0.0621*** 0.0790*** 
 (0.0265) (0.0170) (0.0144) (0.0128) 
     
     
Constant 1.808*** 1.682*** 1.596*** 1.582*** 
 (0.152) (0.138) (0.138) (0.138) 
     
Observations 6,517 6,517 6,517 6,481 
R-squared 0.944 0.944 0.944 0.943 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 





Table 8: The Effect of Tariff Exposure on State Prices for Imported Rice  
 
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log(Price of Imported Rice) Tariff Tariff Lag 1 Month Tariff Lag 2 Month Tariff Lag 3 Month 
     
Local Rice 0.378*** 0.373*** 0.365*** 0.366*** 
 (0.0287) (0.0282) (0.0284) (0.0281) 
Thai Price 0.212*** 0.228*** 0.244*** 0.252*** 
 (0.0198) (0.0191) (0.0194) (0.0185) 
Tariff Exposure 0.0603 0.0387*** 0.0439*** 0.0462*** 
 (0.0603) (0.00849) (0.00727) (0.00672) 
     
Constant 2.282*** 2.177*** 2.185*** 2.168*** 
 (0.297) (0.130) (0.131) (0.125) 
     
Observations 6,505 6,480 6,436 6,401 
R-squared 0.964 0.963 0.963 0.963 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 















Table 9: Effect of Tariff Changes on Household Consumption of Imported Rice (OLS)  
 
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
HH Consumption of Imported Rice 
(g) 
Tariff Tariff Lag 1 Month Tariff Lag 2 Month Tariff Lag 3 Month 
     
Tariff -3.206** -3.206** -3.625*** -22.85*** 
 (1.259) (1.259) (1.254) (2.023) 
     
Constant 3,531*** 3,531*** 3,585*** 5,183*** 
 (1,103) (1,103) (1,105) (1,058) 
     
Observations 18,872 18,872 18,872 18,872 
R-squared 0.204 0.204 0.204 0.218 
Enumeration Area Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Household controls include income, a dummy for if the head of household has a higher education, household members, religion, a 



















Table 10: Effect of Tariff Changes on Household Consumption of Local Rice (OLS)  
 
 
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
HH Consumption of Local Rice (g) Tariff Tariff Lag 1 Month Tariff Lag 2 Month Tariff Lag 3 Month 
     
Tariff 7.646*** 7.646*** 7.466*** -4.509*** 
 (1.103) (1.103) (1.117) (1.271) 
     
Constant 910.6* 910.6* 914.4* 1,557*** 
 (479.4) (479.4) (480.6) (477.4) 
     
Observations 24,083 24,083 24,083 24,083 
R-squared 0.156 0.156 0.156 0.154 
Enumeration Area Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Notes: Household controls include income, a dummy for if the head of household has a higher education, household members, religion, a 


















Table 11: Effect of Tariff Changes on Household Total Rice Consumption (OLS)  
 
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
HH Total Rice Consumption (g) Tariff Tariff Lag 1 Month Tariff Lag 2 Month Tariff Lag 3 Month 
     
Tariff -1.637 -1.637 -2.288 -21.98*** 
 (1.419) (1.419) (1.418) (1.996) 
     
Constant 2,354*** 2,354*** 2,414*** 3,969*** 
 (626.1) (626.1) (627.6) (620.4) 
     
Observations 18,872 18,872 18,872 18,872 
R-squared 0.178 0.178 0.178 0.192 
Enumeration Area Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Household controls include income, a dummy for if the head of household has a higher education, household members, religion, a 




















Table 12: Effect of Changes in Tariff Exposure on HH Per Capita Consumption of Imported Rice (g) 
 
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
HH Per Capita Consumption 
of Imported Rice (g)  
Tariff Tariff Lag 1 Month Tariff Lag 2 Months Tariff Lag 3 Months 
     
Tariff Exposure -3.286 -3.286 -3.676 -28.27*** 
 (5.605) (5.605) (5.615) (7.950) 
 
Constant 401.1* 401.1* 404.2* 588.4*** 
 (215.5) (215.5) (215.9) (220.0) 
     
Observations 20,678 20,678 20,678 20,678 
R-squared 
Household Controls 
State Fixed Effects 


















Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by state. Household controls include income, a dummy for if the head of household has a higher 
















Table 13: Effects of Changes in Tariff Exposure on HH Per Capita Consumption of Local Rice 
 
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
HH Per Capita Consumption 
of Local Rice (g) 
Tariff Tariff Lag 1 Month Tariff Lag 2 Months Tariff Lag 3 Months 
     
Tariff Exposure -1.056 -1.056 -1.635 7.436** 
 (2.429) (2.429) (2.920) (3.490) 
     
Constant -127.9 -127.9 -123.6 -191.1* 
 (107.0) (107.0) (109.7) (112.2) 
     
Observations 20,678 20,678 20,678 20,678 
R-squared 
Household Controls 
State Fixed Effects 


















Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by state. Household controls include income, a dummy for if the head of household has a higher 















Table 14: Effect of Changes in Tariff Exposure on HH Per Capita Consumption of Rice 
 
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
HH Per Capita Consumption 
of Total Rice (g) 
Tariff Tariff Lag 1 Month Tariff Lag 2 Months Tariff Lag 3 Months 
     
Tariff Exposure            -4.342 -4.342 -5.310 -20.84*** 
 (5.589) (5.589) (5.893) (7.856) 
     
Constant 273.2 273.2 280.6 397.3 
 (234.8) (234.8) (236.6) (242.1) 
 
Observations 20,678 20,678 20,678 20,678 
R-squared 
Household Controls  
State Fixed Effects 






















Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by state. Household controls include income, a dummy for if the head of household has a higher 

















Table 15: Effect of Changes in Tariff Exposure on HH Per Capita Consumption of Imported Rice (g) (with State Time Trends)  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Tariff Tariff Lag 1 Month Tariff Lag 2 Months Tariff Lag 3 Months 
     
Tariff Exposure -596.1** -596.1** -34.28 -0.0157 
 (252.6) (252.6) (26.93) (0.0282) 
 
Constant 1,608*** 1,608*** 777.4*** 3.116*** 
 (472.1) (472.1) (135.9) (0.846) 
     











State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by state. Household controls include income, a dummy for if the head of household has a higher 

















Table 16: Effects of Changes in Production Based Tariff Exposure on HH Per Capita Consumption of Imported, Local, and Total Rice  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variables: Imported Rice (g) Local Rice (g) Total Rice (g) 
    
Tariff Exposure  -0.293*** -0.185 -0.478*** 
(Lagged 3 Months) (0.103) (0.138) (0.148) 
    
Constant 1,194*** 629.2*** 1,823*** 
 (451.1) (150.8) (465.4) 
    
Observations 22,337 22,337 22,337 
R-squared 0.191 0.295 0.107 
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
State Time Trend Yes Yes Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: Standard errors are clustered by state. Household controls include income, a dummy for if the head of household has a higher 
education, religion, a control for if the household produces rice, and a rural control. Proper population weights are utilized.  
  
 
